We develop a theory that focuses on the general equilibrium and long-run macroeconomic consequences of trends in job utility. Given secular increases in job utility, work hours per capita can remain approximately constant over time even if the income e¤ect of higher wages on labor supply exceeds the substitution e¤ect. In addition, secular improvements in job utility can be substantial relative to welfare gains from ordinary technological progress. These two implications are connected by an equation ‡owing from optimal hours choices: improvements in job utility that have a signi…cant e¤ect on labor supply tend to have large welfare e¤ects.
Introduction
In his 1930 essay, "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren,"Keynes predicted that a large increase in leisure would take place over the following century, but robust signs of such a leisure boom have failed to materialize. As shown in Figure ( Left panel: di¤erence between the natural logarithm of work hours per working age population and its corresponding value in 1956. Right panel: di¤erence between the natural logarithm of private consumption per working age population and its corresponding value in 1956. Data are at yearly frequency. Consumption is taken from the Penn World Tables (pwt.sas). Hours per population are the product of hours worked per worker and the employment-to-population ratio. Hours worked per worker are from the Groningen Total Economy Database (which is maintained by the Conference Board, conference-board.org). Data on the working-age population (ages 15-64) and employment are from the OECD (stats.oecd.org). Countries: Australia, Canada, Euro (simple average of countryspeci…c ratios over Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), Japan and United States.
In principle there are four alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanations through which the paradox of hard work can be rationalized (detailed just below). Of the set of explanations for the paradox of hard work, in this paper we focus on job utility. Economists have long understood that cross-sectional di¤erences in job utility at a particular time give rise to compensating di¤erentials. We develop a theory that focuses on a less-studied topic:
understanding the long-run macroeconomic consequences of trends in job utility.
The four rationalizations of the paradox of hard work are as follows.
1. Assuming that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is large. However, empirical evidence suggests the contrary. Hall (1988) …nds this elasticity to be approximately zero, Basu and Kimball (2002) …nd that plausible values are less than 0.7, and Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2011) …nd a value of approximately 0.08. 2 2. An increasing ratio of e¤ective marginal wages to consumption. This could be the result, for instance, of a reduction in the progressivity of the tax system, an intensi…cation of competition for promotions within …rms, and increasing educational debts. 3 3. Anything that keeps the marginal utility of consumption high. This could be, for example, because of habit formation, whether internal and external ("keeping up with the Joneses"), and from the introduction of new goods. 4 4. Anything that serves to keep the marginal disutility of work low. This can be, for instance, the result of technological progress in household production, non-separability between consumption and leisure (King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) , Basu and Kimball (2002) ), and jobs getting nicer. 5 We propose an intertemporal framework for thinking about the causes and e¤ects of secular increases in job utility, that is, of jobs getting nicer. Some of the questions that our framework provides answers to are the following.
How do (on-the-job) e¤ort, amenities, job-enjoyment technology, and labor-augmenting technology interact?
What are the key determinants of long-run labor supply given job utility?
How does job utility matter for …rms'optimization problems and …rms'ongoing ability to operate, attract workers, and establish job parameters given long-run changes in labor-augmenting technology and job-enjoyment technology?
What are the long-run welfare e¤ects of changes in job utility?
In turn, the answers to these questions lead to two contributions to the macro and labor economics literatures. First, we show that secular improvements in job utility-the decline of drudgery-can induce work hours to remain approximately constant over time even if the income e¤ect of higher wages on labor supply exceeds the substitution e¤ect of higher wages. Therefore, the paradox of hard work is not necessarily evidence that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is large, that preferences are strongly non-separable, or that preferences have some other feature such as habit formation. Second, we show that secular improvements in job utility can be very substantial in comparison to the welfare gains from ordinary (say, labor-augmenting) technological progress. These two implications are connected by an equation: improvements in job utility that have a signi…cant e¤ect on labor supply tend to have large welfare e¤ects. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the static theory of compensating di¤erentials. Section 3 provides a general overview of our framework. Then, Section 4 discusses the variables we focus on and how our formulation maps into the real world. Sections 5 and 6 focus, respectively, on the optimization problems of individuals and …rms. Section 7 deals with the economy's general equilibrium. Then, Section 8 addresses the welfare consequence of changes in job utility. Finally, section 9 concludes.
The Static Theory of Compensating Di¤erentials
The natural point of reference for our analysis is the theory of compensating di¤erentials, spelled out originally in the …rst ten chapters of Book I of "The Wealth of Nations" (Smith, 1776) . A standard modern reference on compensating di¤erentials is Rosen (1986).
Worker and Firm Choices
The solid line in the left panel of Figure 2 is a wage/job-utility frontier: jobs o¤ering lower job utility will, in principle, compensate by o¤ering higher real wages (in the …gure W is the real wage and J is job utility). Thus, all else equal, individuals face a trade-o¤ between these two variables. Conditional on individual preferences, a particular worker optimizes by choosing a feasible point on the (solid) frontier in the (W; J) plane.
The solid line in the right panel of Figure 2 is a job-utility/output frontier: in order to improve job utility …rms must divert part of their resources away from the production of output (Y ). Given its idiosyncratic costs of job utility in terms of output, a particular …rm optimizes by choosing a feasible point on the (solid) frontier in the (Y; J) plane. 
Movements Along the Frontiers
Suppose higher output and higher real wages came from movements along the solid frontiers (a to b in the left panel and c to d in the right panel). As argued in Kimball and Shapiro (2008) , income e¤ects on labor supply are substantial. So, the higher real wage implied by moving from point a to point b would tend to reduce work hours. In addition, if work hours are increasing in job utility, then lower job utility implied by moving from point a to point b also puts downward pressure on work hours.
Movements of the Frontiers
However, the frontiers themselves can shift (the dashed lines in Figure 2 ). As the economy's choice set expands, optimal choices can entail moving to points such as a 0 and d 0 , in which case job utility, output, and real wages all rise, and increases in job utility emerge as potentially o¤setting to income e¤ects.
The theory we develop in this paper focuses attention on understanding the dynamic general equilibrium implications and endogenous foundations of such intertemporal changes in the economy's choice set. This understanding is complementary to the long-standing static, partial equilibrium microeconomic framework of compensating di¤erentials.
The Social Planner' s Perspective
There are no distortions in our model so the planning version of the economy is equivalent to a decentralized economy with perfect competition. Both perspectives are valuable, and we begin with the social planning perspective.
Consider individuals who obtain utility from consumption and non-work time. A standard assumption is that any time devoted to work always subtracts from utility. Our alternative assumption is that process bene…ts and process costs of work-what we call "job utility"-matter as well.
The problem that an idealized social planner would face helps summarize our overall framework. The social planner's problem involves choosing consumption, capital, work hours devoted to particular jobs, e¤ort demands by a particular job (per hour of work), and amenities provided by a particular job in order to maximize a household's lifetime utility given …rms'production structures and other standard constraints.
Baseline Assumptions
We consider a small open economy in which agents can freely borrow and lend at the exogenously determined real interest rate r (equal to , the rate at which all economic agents discount the future). Capital is freely mobile across …rms and boarders. We assume that all bene…ts and costs to …rms and workers other than the utility from leisure and consumption are proportional to work hours. These assumptions jointly guarantee that there will never be any disagreement between workers and …rms about job parameters other than the wage.
Furthermore, given fully mobile capital and the exogenous world interest rate, we can focus on steady state analysis since the absence of state variables implies that changes between steady states occur instantaneously. The model is cast in continuous time (we omit time indexes in order to avoid notational clutter).
Individuals and Firms
The economy is inhabited by i = 1,...,I …rms all of which are producers of the same …nal good and a continuum of individuals whose mass is normalized to one. Households each have only one individual, so we will use the terms household and worker interchangeably.
Utility depends on consumption, the division of time into work time and non-work time, and job utility per hour of work. Job utility depends on e¤ort, amenities, and job-enjoyment technology (we elaborate on all of these further below).
Firms produce output using capital and e¤ective labor input (the product of hours, e¤ort and labor-augmenting technology), and can vary in their real wage and job utility o¤erings. Table 1 below lays out our notation. In that notation, the planning problem is:
Planning Problem
and
For any variable X, _ X refers to its change over time. 
Consumption and Work Hours

Consumption
Consumption, C, is meant to capture all the richness of how resources other than time a¤ect life outside of working hours. For instance, a broad notion of consumption necessarily accounts for fringe bene…ts.
Work Hours
Work hours, H, is meant to capture every way in which a person's job interferes with the quantity and enjoyment of non-work time and home production. For example, if an individual is unable to stop thinking about work issues while at home and this interferes with other activities at home, then that can be considered an e¤ective reduction in leisure and hence an increase in H. Also, consider time spent away from home due to work-related travel. Travel may boost the utility of non-work time if it provides pleasant and interesting experiences.
However, work-related travel can also hamper the enjoyment of non-work time because of being away from friends and family. In either case, an adjustment to H may be warranted.
Job Utility
E¤ort
E¤ort, E, is meant to capture all aspects of a job that generate proportionate changes in e¤ective productive input from labor. E¤ort has many dimensions. For example, the intensity of a worker's concentration on a task while at his or her work station, the amount of time spent at the water cooler or in other forms of on-the-job leisure, own time spent cleaning and beautifying the work place, time spent in o¢ ce parties or morale building exercises during work hours, and amount of time spent pursuing worker interests that have some productivity to the …rm but would not be the boss's …rst priority, are all dimensions of e¤ort.
Amenities
Amenities, A, are job characteristics whose cost to the …rm is in terms of goods. The real-world characterization of amenities is just as rich as the characterization of e¤ort. For instance, amenities include the number of parking spots, the quality of air conditioning, and the quality and capacity relative to the number of employees of the o¢ ce gym. terms of who does what, how they do it and when they do it, and allowing individuals greater ‡exibility in determining the time during which work is carried out all count historically as innovations in the nature of work proper.
Innovations in the Nature of the External Work Environment Innovations related to the external work environment come in many forms as well. In particular, think of the advent of air conditioning, the distribution, design, and allocation of physical work space (such as cubicalization or open o¢ ce environments), the provision of on-site childcare, exercise, and laundry facilities, and the institution of measures to reduce the incidence of sexual harassment.
Interpretation of the Job Utility Function
The job utility function J i itself is the optimum over many possible ways of doing things.
For example, consider two production techniques, as shown in Figure 3 in (E; J) space.
Production technique 1, yielding J 1 i , results in relatively higher job utility at lower levels of e¤ort, while production technique 2, yielding J 2 i , results in relatively higher job utility at higher levels of e¤ort. Then, J i is the upper envelope (bold) of these two techniques.
The analytical framework that we develop is robust to such non-concavities in job-utility functions.
Figure 3:
The job-utility function, J i , as the upper envelope of the two di¤erent production techniques J 
Reducing the Number of Dimensions for the Arguments of Job Utility
The function J i = J i (E i ; A i ; i ) maps E i , A i , and i into the hourly utility associated with being at work. E i is a vector describing all dimensions of what the average hour of work is like that a¤ects productivity (aspects of e¤ort, including the fraction of time spent in each di¤erent activity at work). A i is the amenities counterpart to this. Recall that i is job-utility technology. E i and A i are determined optimally by …rms.
The reduced form job utility function comes from maximizing over these vectors, subject to keeping e¤ort-related productivity and the cost of amenities the same, that is,
where p A i is a vector of real amenity prices. So, the number E i -hourly e¤ort per workergives e¤ective productive input from an hour of labor before multiplication by labor-augmenting technology, while the number A i summarizes the expenditure on amenities per hour of work. 7 We allow for J i to be either positive or negative and we allow for the possibility that job utility is increasing in e¤ort at relatively small levels of e¤ort, but we assume it must be decreasing in e¤ort at relatively high levels of e¤ort if only because physical and mental exhaustion eventually push J i toward 1 (otherwise there would be no upper limit to feasible E i ). 8 We also assume that @J i =@A i > 0 and @J i =@ i . 7 The relative price of amenities can simply be thought of as being part of the overall technological component i . Indeed, think of production of …rm is kth ammenity as
where k i is technology and Y K i is the amount of the …rm's total output, Y i , devoted to producing the amenity. Then, the …rm's total expenditure on amenity k is (1=
. Thus, for instance, an increase in technology k i decreases the relative price of the kth amenity. Except when the real prices of amenities are visible in markets it might be impossible to distinguish between an improvement in job-enjoyment technology and a fall in the price of an amenity. 8 We consider this to be the more intuitive case, although our results are unaltered by assuming that job utility is always decreasing in e¤ort.
5 The Household
Optimization
We now focus on the decentralized version of the representative worker's optimization problem. We show that this problem can be broken into three optimization subproblems that jointly answer the following question: Once job utility is accounted for, what are the key determinants of labor supply?
Main Problem
Given …nancial wealth M and job opportunities, the worker chooses consumption C, total work hours H, work hours devoted to each job H i , to maximize utility
Overall ‡ow utility comes from consumption utility U , utility from o¤-the-job leisure , W i is the real wage o¤ered by the ith job, which the worker takes as given. We assume that U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0, 0 > 0, and 00 < 0. The choice of job is represented simply as the choice of whether to devote strictly positive work hours to any one job in particular. Here, we assume that utility is additively separable between consumption C and all the dimensions of labor.
(A companion paper relaxes that assumption, and yields broadly similar results as those we obtain in the present paper).
Optimization Subproblems
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with the worker's problem is
This maximization problem can be broken down into four optimization subproblems:
Above, is the costate variable giving the marginal value of real wealth; the Euler equation is _ = r = 0. b is the multiplier on the work-hours constraint. i is the multiplier on the nonnegativity constraint for hours at each possible job. 9 Finally, B i denotes the marginal hourly net job bene…ts associated with a job of type i. The four optimization subproblems nested within maximization of the current-value Hamiltonian are: (1) the consumption decision; (2) job choice; (3) the decision about work hours for each job; and (4) the overall hours decision.
In the additively separable case here we normalize J i and so that 0 (T ) = 0. 10 Given this normalization, J i > 0 means that a worker would be willing to spend at least some time on a job even if unpaid, should that be the only job available. On the other hand, J i < 0 means that a worker would never do such a job unless paid. 9 The worker's problem would be dramatically di¤erent if it were possible to devote negative work hours to unpleasant, badly paid jobs. 10 Consider U +~ +HJ i with~ 0 (T ) = , where is a constant. De…ne (X) =~ (X) X and J i =J i + . Then, 0 (T ) = 0, and
Choice of Consumption As shown in the left panel of Figure 4 , the solution to the …rst optimization sub-problem, max
Cg, is to choose consumption to satisfy the …rst order condition U 0 = . 
This implies that b = B: the marginal bene…t of overall work hours is equal to the marginal bene…t of hours at the job with the highest job bene…ts. Therefore, total work hours should be chosen to satisfy 0 = B. In words, at the optimal level of work hours, the marginal utility from o¤-the-job leisure is equal to job bene…ts B of the most attractive job. Thus, the right panel of Figure 4 shows the determination of the optimal choice of H. Note that the labor-hours supply function is 0 , and the equivalent to a market clearing price for work hours is job bene…ts B. (We postpone discussion of the determination of the general equilibrium value of B to Section 7.). Recall that B = W i + J i , and that as shown in the right panel of Figure 4 , work hours are increasing in B. If the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect, then W i is decreasing (W i is growing, but is declining in line with increases in consumption), which.
Implications
All else equal that makes B-and therefore work hours-decrease as well.
But if job utility, J i , is rising su¢ ciently, then the income e¤ect can be counterbalanced by the increase in J i along with the increase in W i that blunts the fall of
There is another surprising implication. Even if W i ! 0 because the income e¤ect overwhelms the substitution e¤ect (that is, because ! 0 more quickly than W i ), work hours will tend to some constant H > 0 as long as job utility J i tends to some constant
That is, even if people face quickly declining marginal utility for additional consumption, a positive asymptote for work hours can exist if there are jobs people enjoy as much as the marginal non-work activity they would otherwise …ll out their days with.
Implications for Job Choices
If two jobs have both the same wages and the same job utility, the division of time between them can only be pinned down by general equilibrium forces. But, when two jobs have the same net job bene…ts but di¤erent combinations of wages and job utility, the endogenous determination of can lead to a determinate interior optimum based on worker optimization alone. Suppose B 1 = B 2 with J 2 > J 1 and W 1 > W 2 . That is, job 1 is higher paid than but job 2 is more pleasant. Let be the fraction of total work hours that the worker devotes to working for …rm 1. At an interior optimum for a worker
.Given the labor-hours supply function, the optimal level of work hours satis…es
. Substituting into the worker's budget constraint implies that
which after rearrangement yields
It follows that for any given marginal value of wealth and job bene…ts, higher exogenous wealth is associated with greater work hours being devoted to jobs with higher job utility and lower wages. Alternatively, at any given set of wages and equilibrium job bene…ts, the higher is the more work hours are devoted to jobs with the highest wages.
Also, note that in the event that more than two jobs have the same net job bene…ts, any but the extreme of these set of jobs-the one with the highest wage and lowest job utility and the one with the lowest wage and highest job utility-is equivalent from the worker's perspective to a convex combination of time devoted to the extreme jobs. So, in the absence of …xed costs of going to work the analysis for i > 2 jobs is essentially the same as for two jobs. (If there are …xed small costs per job, the worker might slightly prefer an in-between job and would never choose three jobs).
Implications for Short-Run Labor Supply
At any given level of job bene…ts B, having a more pleasant, lower-paying job will result in a lower (Frisch) labor supply elasticity. To see this, rewrite B = W i + J i as (W i (1 i )), where i J i = W i is the fraction of the wage that is a compensating di¤erential. De…ning
is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Thus, the higher job utility is, the lower is labor supply elasticity with respect to temporary changes in the real wage.
The results about multiple jobs in Section 5.2.2 suggested that as economies become richer, workers are likely to switch to jobs with higher job utility. Therefore, if as determined by the curvature of stays relatively constant as an economy gets richer, the volatility of work hours will fall relative to the volatility of temporary changes in the real wage. Cross-sectionally, and more speculatively, workers employed in jobs that they "hate"
should have a higher Frisch labor supply elasticity if the relevant curvature of is similar across workers in these di¤erent jobs.
Firms
In the decentralized version of the optimization problem for …rms, the …rms are price takers in the product market. Each …rm's production function takes as inputs capital and e¤ective labor input (the product of hours, e¤ort, and labor-augmenting technology). The …rm rents capital at an exogenous rental rate (determined by the international real interest rate). The hourly cost of labor is captured by the inclusive wage: the sum of the real wage and the hourly cost of amenities. The solution to the …rm's cost minimization problem implies that its cost function can be stated as a function of the rental rate of capital and the e¤ective wage: the ratio of the inclusive wage to e¤ective labor productivity (the product of e¤ort and labor-augmenting technology). Minimization of the e¤ective wage is the focus of the …rm's optimization subproblems.
Cost Minimization
Consider a representative providing a job with job-enjoyment technology i . The …rm's production function is
, where capital's share 2 (0; 1) and other variables are as de…ned earlier. Let R denote the rental rate of capital, which is exogenous to the …rm. (There are no adjustment costs, so R = r + ).
For any output level Y i a …rm's cost minimization problem involves choosing capital K i , and total work hours H i , to minimize total cost
W i is the inclusive wage:
That is, in payment for their labor, workers receive the real wage W i (which includes fringe bene…ts), and as indirect payment-through job utility-amenities A i .
The solution to the …rm's costs minimization problem is standard. The …rm's total cost is a function of the desired level of output, Y i , the rental rate of capital, R, and the e¤ective wage, ! i . The e¤ective wage ! i is equal to the inclusive wage per labor e¤ectiveness:
Thus, the …rm's cost function is
Optimization Subproblems for Firms
The rental rate of capital is exogenous, but the e¤ective wage is a function of the real wage, e¤ort, and amenities, all of which are choice variables: How should the …rm analyze its decision? First, unless the …rm is going to shut down, the …rm must choose the e¤ective wage so that the …rm o¤ers are at least as high as equilibrium job bene…ts. Then, two nested subproblems follow. The …rst subproblem involves the choice of amenities. Then, given the optimal choice of amenities, the …rm faces a decision about the real wage and e¤ort. The solution to both of these nested subproblems can be summarized in terms of tangency conditions.
The Central Optimization Subproblem: Minimizing the E¤ective Wage
Given equation (2), any operating …rm should minimize its e¤ective wage subject to its constraints:
In solving this optimization subproblem …rms take the marginal value of wealth , the rental rate of capital R, and equilibrium job bene…ts B, as given. However, both the real wage W i , and amenities A i , are choice variables. We will assume additive separability in job utility between e¤ort and amenities:
where 
First Nested Subproblem: Choice of Amenities
By the de…nitions of the inclusive and e¤ective wages
Substituting this last equation into the …rm's problem of meeting the market level of B so it can attract workers (which must bind at the optimal solution) it follows that
This implies the nested subproblem:
Thus, the choice of amenities should satisfy the tangency condition @G i =@A = . This optimality condition is shown graphically in (A; G) space in the left panel of Figure 5 . 
It is helpful to de…ne
S ;
the individual surplus received from the …rm's optimal choice of amenities. Note that S < 0 by the envelope theorem. Thus, the lower the marginal value of wealth (intuitively, the richer a worker is), the greater the surplus from amenities.
Second Nested Subproblem: Choice of E¤ort
Given the optimal choice of amenities, the …rm's problem of minimizing the e¤ective wage reduces to a second nested subproblem:
where J i is the net job utility function (net of the costs of amenity provision measured in utils). Rearranging,
and the objective is to …nd a feasible value of J i corresponding to the lowest ! i . In E; J space the left-hand side of equation (5) traces out all e¤ort and job-utility combinations that are consistent with any given e¤ective wage: the …rm's isocost lines shown as downward sloping lines in the right panel of Figure 5 . In that same panel the job utility function is shown as a concave curve. The …rm's objective is to …nd the tangency that yields an isocost line with the intercept at B and minimum downward (absolute value) slope that touches the job utility curve.
In other words, given B, the solution to the …rm's optimization subproblem is implicitly captured by the isocost line that has the ‡attest (algebraically greatest) feasible slope.
Feasibility is determined by the …rm's net job utility function, which captures all net job utility and e¤ort combinations that a …rm is able to o¤er. As seen in the right panel of Given A i and S ; A i , once the optimal E i and ! i are pinned down, it is straightforward to back out the optimal W i using the de…nition of the e¤ective wage and the value of J i given the de…nition of net job utility.
Why E¤ort is Unpleasant at the Optimum
Despite the fact that job utility can be increasing in e¤ort for some part of the range, the tangency condition shown in the right panel of Figure 5 implies that e¤ort will be unpleasant at the optimum. Indeed, at the optimum:
Then, > 0 and E i > 0 imply that for positive wages (and nonnegative amenities), at the optimal choice of e¤ort @J i =@E i < 0. That is, the optimal choice of e¤ort occurs where job utility is decreasing in e¤ort.
In other words, since e¤ort is productive it would make no sense to limit e¤ort when additional e¤ort is also pleasant. E¤ort should be increased until additional e¤ort is painful enough that it counterbalances the extra productivity.
Equilibrium
The next question is: How are equilibrium job bene…ts and the marginal value of wealth determined?
Job Bene…ts
From any …rm's point of view the …rm-speci…c e¤ective wage, ! i , must equal the prevailing market value of ! for the …rm to have positive output. Perfect competition in the product market implies that, in equilibrium, each …rm's marginal cost is equal to the price of …nal output-which is normalized to 1. Given the cost function in equation (2) that means …rms with positive output must have
, which implies
. Figure 6 extends the intuition from Figure 5 to this case in which, as far as a representative …rm is concerned, the slope of an isocost line Z i ! is exogenously determined. Because cost minimization must hold, optimality continues to require being at a point of tangency between the net job utility function and an isocost line. Amenities A i are determined as earlier.
Given the values of , Z i , and !, the …rm faces, the left panel of Figure 6 shows optimal e¤ort requirements, E i , and net job utility, J i . These determine the optimal real wage The intersection of the …rm's isocost line with the horizontal axis now determines equilibrium job bene…ts B. Given this equilibrium level of B, the right panel of Figure 6 shows the determination of total work hours, H. This logic can be expressed by the functions
Note that the …rm that is able to o¤er the highest job bene…ts is the …rm that implicitly sets the economy's equilibrium level of job bene…ts.
The Marginal Value of Wealth
The Labor Earnings Functions
In general equilibrium, our open-economy framework has r = , and C = rM + + H P i i W i , where i is the fraction of total work hours that the individual devotes to …rm i. (Thus, P i i = 1.). Let W = P i i W i denote the wage averaged across jobs. Given the individual's …rst-order condition for consumption, a labor-earnings demand function (LE D ) can be de…ned as follows:
Since W i = Z i !E i A i , a labor-earnings supply function (LE S ) can be de…ned in this way:
where once again we have made use of the de…nition of the average wage.
Graphing Labor-Earnings Demand and Labor-Earnings Supply
Labor-Earnings Demand U 0 ( ) is decreasing in C. Therefore, equation (6) implies a negative relationship between and labor-earnings demand as measured by WH. Thus, in (WH; ) space the labor-earnings demand function is downward sloping.
Labor-Earnings Supply For labor-earnings supply consider …rst the case in which only clones of …rm i exist. Then, LE S is given by
Showing that in (WH; ) space labor-earnings supply is downward sloping requires answering the following three questions. (b) What does a change in imply for the isocost lines? The right panel of Figure 7 shows that higher 0 implies a steeper isocost line, which in turn leads to a decline in net job utility and a rise in e¤ort. Also, although the change can seem ambiguous, job bene…ts rise to B 0 , which leads to higher work hours. 11 dB=d > 0 means that the H in WH goes up.
(c) How do real wages factor in? If all …rms are identical W is trivially equal to W i . The analysis behind Figure 7 showed that the result of higher marginal value of wealth includes lower amenities, A i , and higher e¤ort, E i . ! is unchanged, and since
Taken together, the answers to these three questions imply that labor-earnings is increasing in so that LE S is upward sloping in (WH; ) space. Figure 8 shows LE D and LE S , and the determination of equilibrium and labor earnings WH when all …rms are identical. Suppose these two types of …rms have job utility functions given by J 1 = J 1 and J 2 = J 2 as depicted in Figure 3 . Then, what is relevant is the upper envelope of these job utility functions. For a su¢ ciently low marginal value of real wealth, say 0 , …rm 1 is able to o¤er the highest marginal net job bene…ts and type 2 …rms do not operate. 
Determination of the Marginal Value of Wealth
where 1 is the fraction of total work hours devoted to …rms of type 1. The appropriate version of labor-earnings supply is slightly di¤erent than that considered earlier. For su¢ -ciently low values of only …rms of type 1 operate and the associated real wages, marginal net job bene…ts, and work hours are relatively low. Therefore, in terms of labor-earnings supply, low values of are associated with low labor earnings.
At the critical value 00 noted above both types of …rms are operational. Figure 9 shows an equilibrium in which both types of …rms are operational. Wages, marginal net job bene…ts, and hours are higher than under 0 -and therefore so are labor earnings. However at 00 any level of labor earnings within a certain range is an equilibrium, implying a perfectly elastic portion of the labor-earnings supply curve. In this region, an increase in non-labor income that shifts LE D out leads to allocations of more hours toward the more pleasant job without changing . Labor earnings supply and demand with two …rms.
Implications
Our framework allows us to address several interesting questions. For instance: How does a …rm's overall technology matter for its competitiveness? What are the e¤ects of changes in technology (whether changes in labor-augmenting technology or job-enjoyment technology) on labor earnings and the marginal value of wealth? Which changes in technology are consistent with higher real wages and trendless labor hours if the income e¤ect outweighs the substitution e¤ect?
In the Appendix, we show the following. First, within our framework, di¤erences in job-enjoyment technology between …rms can counterbalance di¤erences in labor-augmenting technology, and vice versa. In particular, a …rm falling behind in labor-augmenting technological progress can keep up its ability to attract workers even with lower wages if its job enjoyability technology advances su¢ ciently. Second, within our framework, a permanent increase in labor augmenting technology, a permanent positive innovation in the nature of work proper, or a permanent positive innovation in the nature of the work environment can each lead simultaneously to higher labor earnings, a lower marginal value of real wealth, and trendless or nearly trendless work hours.
In essence, then, anything that "regular"technology can do, job enjoyability technology can do as well. To the extent that higher job utility matters for competitiveness, it is even plausible that …rms might set what would otherwise be above-optimal e¤ort requirements in order to induce workers themselves to think of ways to increase job utility. This amounts to a low cost form of research and development in job enjoyment technology.
Welfare
We argue above that and upward trend in job utility make it possible for work hours to remain approximately constant over time even if the income e¤ect of higher real wages on labor supply exceeds the substitution e¤ect of higher real wages. The question that immediately follows is: What are the welfare e¤ects of such changes? In this section, we elaborate on the relationship between job utility and welfare, suggest ways in which theoretical relationships can be operationalized and give a numerical example for the potential welfare gains associated with secular changes in job utility. Under straightforward though far from certain assumptions, given constant work hours, an observed increase in consumption of 1% might be associated with an increase in welfare of 2%. In this case, at least half of these welfare gains are coming from increases in job utility.
Measuring Welfare
In our framework, changes in welfare induced by changes in exogenous parameters are well assessed via comparative steady-state analysis. In steady state, given r = , an individual's problem is equivalent to the static optimization problem
Given the multipliers and b, let
Recall that the optimal choice of H i yields two cases:
where, B denotes the economy's level of equilibrium marginal net job bene…ts.
Using the envelope theorem,
Above, each of the three terms on the right-hand side highlight distinct ways in which the economy's opportunity set becomes larger. Changes in welfare from changes in job utility are captured by the …rst term; changes in welfare from higher wages are re ‡ected in the second term; and changes in welfare from changes in exogenous wealth appear in the last term. The …rst term ( P i H i ) dJ i = can be interpreted as the portion of the change in the maximized value of utility that answers the question of how much the worker would have to be paid per year in order to be willing to go back to working in yesterday's conditions.
Toward Pinning Down the Implied Increase in Welfare
To better understand the implications of the envelope theorem as laid out in equation (8) note that the second term on the right-hand side is the change in wages for narrowly de…ned job categories (for which, empirically, it should be possible to obtain a direct measure) and
Therefore, to gauge this component of welfare, we need to adjust the change in overall labor
earnings by subtracting not only extra earnings from people working longer hours overall, but also extra earnings coming from people switching towards jobs that are more highly paid and have lower job utility. If W is moving down, then the overall trend should involve compositional shifts towards jobs with higher job utility and relatively lower pay than other available jobs. This means that the increase in labor earnings will tend to understate the true increase in welfare (leaving aside changes in overall hours, which obviously need to be adjusted for).
In terms of understanding the remaining terms for the change in welfare, note that
Thus, pinning down the …rst term in the right-hand side of equation (8) calls for looking at labor hours, consumption, and hourly wages. Substituting into equation (8) and rearranging
The last term on the right-hand side-the value of extra non-labor income-is easy to understand. Hence, we will focus on getting measures for the …rst two terms on the right-hand side of equation (9) .
(That is, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.).
Then d = = dC=C. Moreover, as discussed earlier, for any job i the Frisch elasticity of labor supply i and the fraction i of the wage that is a compensating di¤erential
Substituting the appropriate expressions into equation (9) and simplifying yields
The intuition for equation (11) is that in the additively separable case tells how many times bigger the income e¤ect is than the substitution e¤ect. If hours are relatively constant despite increasing wages, then there must be substantial increases in job utility to counteract the income e¤ects associated with increases in consumption. On the other hand, if hours H move in the direction indicated by the income e¤ect it gives less hint of improvements in job utility. (If = 1, income and substitution e¤ects cancel, but increases in consumption still have the usual e¤ect on welfare.).
Calibrating from job choices
In addition to evidence from the e¤ects of interest rates on the path of consumption, in principle evidence about can be found from workers'job choices. Consider an individual working two jobs satisfying J 2 > J 1 . Then,
For any individual with dJ 1 dJ 2 = 0, for example, dJ 1 ; dJ 2 = 0, then
and using d = = dC=C it follows that
Illustrating the Calculation of Welfare Gains
The short-run elasticity of intertemporal substitution has been suggested by Hall (1988) to be approximately zero, and by Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2011) to be 0.08. However, there are reasons to think the long-run elasticity of intertemporal substitution should be higher than its short-run counterpart. This includes taking account of full adjustment, new goods, habit formation, and "keeping up with the Joneses." In the context of our analysis, it is the long-run elasticity of intertemporal substitution that should be used. Suppose the long-run elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 0.5, in which case = 2. Using this value for along with equation (11) implies that for d = 0, dM = 0, and dH = 0, a 1% increase in consumption would be associated with a welfare increase of at least 2%.
A natural question that follows is what fraction of welfare gains are attributable to higher job utility. To see this, note that dividing equation (8) by P i H i W i and combining it with equation (11) yields
where the second term on the left-hand side re ‡ects switching from relatively higher paid jobs to relatively lower paid jobs. If there were no changes in job utility or hours then a 1% increase in consumption is just a 1% increase in consumption. But, if consumption increases 1%, = 2, dH = 0 endogenously despite the income e¤ect exceeding the substitution e¤ect, then this equation implies an increase in welfare equivalent to the direct e¤ect of a 2% increase in consumption. So, the di¤erence, 1%, must be due to improvements in job utility from the two terms on the left of equation (12).
Conclusions
The paradox of hard work is this: for decades, work hours per capita among adults have remained roughly trendless, despite strong trends in macroeconomic variables, such as real consumption and real wages. In principle, the paradox of hard work can be rationalized in several di¤erent ways. Of these alternatives, we focus on the general equilibrium e¤ects of secular changes that make work more pleasant. Economists have long understood that crosssectional di¤erences in job utility at a particular time give rise to compensating di¤erentials.
In this paper, we develop a theory that focuses on the less-studied long-run macroeconomic consequences of trends in job utility.
Our theory allows for the interaction of work hours (which stands in for all aspects of the job that interfere with leisure and home production) and e¤ort (which stands in for all aspects of a job whose cost is in terms of proportionate changes in e¤ective productive input from labor). We also consider the role of amenities (which we de…ne to be job characteristics whose cost is in terms of goods) and the role of secular increases in job utility (that is, secular declines in drudgery, which can stem from changes in standard notions of technology, such as labor-augmenting technology, and also from changes in job-enjoyment technology). General equilibrium can be analyzed through two new theoretical objects: labor-earnings supply and labor-earnings demand.
Two main implications emerge. First, secular improvements in job utility imply that work hours can remain approximately constant over time even if the income e¤ect of higher wages on labor supply exceeds the substitution e¤ect of higher wages. Second, secular improvements in job utility can themselves be a substantial component of the welfare gains from technological progress. These two implications are connected by an equation ‡owing from optimal hours choices: improvements in job utility that have a signi…cant e¤ect on labor supply tend to have large welfare e¤ects.
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A Details for the Labor-Earnings Supply Derivation
Firms maximize net job bene…ts given the constraints they face. In particular,
The envelope theorem implies that when changes
whenever W i > 0. Since this is true for all jobs, the maximum B i over all i must also increase.
The fact that dB=d > 0 highlights an interesting role for amenities. Consider a decline in the marginal value of wealth. In the absence of amenities, in E; J space the job utility function would remain …xed while isocost curves became less steep and job bene…ts declined.
Yet, once amenities are considered, a lower marginal value of wealth shifts the net job utility function shifts up in E; J space. Because of the logic of the envelope theorem job bene…ts must still decline, but not as much as they would in the absence of amenities. Thus, endogenous provision of amenities blunts the e¤ect of lower . In other words, changes in amenities serve as endogenous bu¤ers to income e¤ects on labor supply.
B The Role of Technology B.1 Competitiveness
Across …rms, di¤erences in job-enjoyment technology can counterbalance di¤erences in laboraugmenting technology, and vice versa. To see this, consider …rms 1 and 2 as shown in Figure   A1 , where 2 < 1 , Z 2 > Z 1 , and …rms di¤er in their net job utility curves. As depicted, although …rm 1 has lower labor-augmenting technology, given its higher job-enjoyment technology it is the one that would implicitly set the economy's equilibrium level of job bene…ts (recall that, all else equal, higher i shifts the job utility curve up). Because workers take jobs with the highest B, …rm 2 is unable to attract workers-and therefore must shut down.
For a higher value of 2 (which would shift J 2 su¢ ciently high up) or a higher Z 2 (which would make …rm 2's isocost lines su¢ ciently steep) …rm 2 could o¤er the exact same level of job bene…ts as …rm 1-in which case both …rms would be able to operate-or even higher job bene…ts-in which case …rm 2 would be the one to implicitly establish economy-wide equilibrium B, and …rm 1 would be unable to attract workers. 
B.2 Labor Earnings and the Marginal Value of Wealth
For the sake of intuition, throughout the remainder of this section we make four simplifying assumptions. 1) We revert to assuming that there is only one …rm and therefore avoid i indexes. 2) For the e¤ects of changes in the nature of work proper, E , three possibilities emerge depending on whether
0 means that changes in E do not a¤ect how onerous extra e¤ort is. @F E =@ E < 0 means that higher E makes extra e¤ort more onerous. @F E =@ E > 0 means that higher E makes increases in e¤ort less onerous. We focus on @F E =@ E 0 since it is the most intuitively appealing possibility. 3) Base on another bit of intuition, we only consider cases in which
We continue to assume the additively separable case J = F + G. Relaxing these assumption leads to interesting analysis but not quite interesting enough to include here.
B.2.1 The E¤ect of a Rise in Z on and WH
Suppose labor-augmenting technology increases from Z toZ > Z. The left panel of Figure   A2 shows that, all else equal, higher Z leads to higher job bene…ts (meaning higher work hours) and higher e¤ort, which leads to higher real wages because the e¤ective wage is constant. These changes jointly imply higher WH. Now, consider the implications of higher Increase in Labor-Augmenting Technology In the case in which Z rises, because e¤ort declines and amenities rise, the real wage can only be higher after the increase in labor-augmenting technology if the product EZ is higher and proportionally greater than the increase in amenities. In mathematical terms, because the e¤ective wage must remain constant, then a rise in Z triggers a rise in real wages only if
In such case, because after the rise in Z real wages are higher and so is job utility, then work hours remain constant as a result of the rise in job utility countervailing the income e¤ect's outweighing of the substitution e¤ect. So, an increase in labor-augmenting technology can indeed be consistent with higher real wages and trendless labor hours (and higher e¤ective labor productivity).
Positive Innovations in Job-Enjoyment Technology If labor-augmenting technology rises, or there is a positive innovation in the nature of work proper and @F E =@ E = 0, or there is a positive innovation in the nature of the work environment and @G A =@ A = 0, then, again, at point A'e¤ort is lower. Because amenities are higher and the e¤ective wage must remain constant, then given that the product EZ is lower real wages must decline.
And this decline must exactly satisfy
So, all else equal, neither a positive innovation in the nature of work proper with @F E =@ E = 0 nor a positive innovation in the nature of the work environment with @G A =@ A = 0 are consistent with both trendless work hours and higher real wages.
B.3.2 Altered Slope of Net Job Utility
Consider an initial equilibrium such as point A in the right panel of Figure A5 , which corresponds to an isocost line with slope Z!. Then, given a positive innovation in the nature of work proper with @F E =@ E > 0, as shown in Section B.2.2 labor earnings rise and the marginal value of real wealth decreases. And, at lower amenities are optimally higher, and the surplus from amenities is also higher-which is consistent with an upward shift in the net job utility function (with change in slope as implied by @F E =@ E > 0) and less steep isocost lines. If there is no change in labor hours but the income e¤ect outweighs the substitution e¤ect, then the new equilibrium must be at a point such as A'in the left panel of Figure A4 -job utility must be higher. At point A 0 e¤ort is higher but the e¤ective wage ! = (W + A) = (EZ) must remain unchanged. Because amenities are also higher, real wages are higher only if
So, when positive innovations in the nature of work proper make e¤ort less taxing, a rise in E can indeed be consistent with higher real wages and trendless labor hours (and higher e¤ective labor productivity).
B.3.3 Technological Equivalence
Comparison of the left and right panels of Figure A4 along with results from Sections B.3.1 and B.3.2 imply that, in principle, the impact of an increase in labor-augmenting technology can be exactly equal to the impact of a positive innovation in the nature of work proper.
